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With the enactment of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 on March 30, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
became law, fundamentally changing health insurance and 
access to health care in the United States. Using the Urban 
Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM), 
we estimate how the ACA would affect the types of health 
insurance coverage Americans have, the number of those 
without insurance, and America’s overall spending on health 
care. For ease of comparison, we simulate the ACA as if fully 
implemented in 2010 and contrast the results with HIPSM’s 
pre-reform baseline results for 2010. Our single-year estimates 
complement the 10-year cost estimates previously released by 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary, 
providing many results—particularly for coverage and transitions 
in coverage—that are either new or broken out by more detailed 
characteristics than in either of those estimates.
We estimate that
  » Under the ACA, the share of nonelderly adults without 
health insurance would decline by 27.8 million, from 18.6 
to 8.3 percent. The number of uninsured would decline for 
all income categories, but the lowest-income would see the 
greatest declines. For example, the number of nonelderly 
uninsured below 200 percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL) would drop by 19.4 million.
  » Nearly 30 percent of those at all income levels who would 
have been uninsured without reform would be covered 
by Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP), nearly 20 percent would be covered under the new 
health insurance exchanges, and an additional 10 percent 
would be covered by private insurance outside the exchanges. 
The other 40 percent would remain uninsured.
  » Nearly 40 percent of those who would still be uninsured 
under the ACA are eligible for Medicaid or CHIP but 
would choose not to enroll. Just over a quarter would be 
undocumented immigrants who are ineligible for public 
insurance coverage or the coverage in new exchanges.
  » Total spending on acute health care for the non-elderly  
by the government, employers, and individuals would 
increase by 4.5 percent under the ACA (excluding the savings 
from multiyear provisions) if it were fully implemented in 
2010. Multiyear provisions such as Medicare and Medicaid 
savings and cost-containment programs were not simulated. 
Total costs to employers would be largely unchanged. 
Spending for most individuals would not change significantly, 
though many of those currently uninsured but ineligible for 
Medicaid or the most generous premium subsidies would 
spend more on premiums for new health insurance or 
individual mandate penalties. 
  » The cost of uncompensated care provided to the uninsured 
would drop by 61 percent. These reductions would allow 
federal and state governments to reduce spending on programs 
that now support the uninsured (not in our government 
baseline). Less uncompensated care could also result in lower 
private premiums and higher provider revenue.
  » The expansion of Medicaid would enroll 13.1 million new 
adults and 3.7 million new children. The newly enrolled 
adults would be much less expensive to cover, on average, 
than current adult Medicaid enrollees.
  » We estimate that 43.8 million nonelderly persons would 
be covered through health insurance exchanges. About 
half of these, 23.1 million, would be covered by nongroup 
(i.e., individually purchased, not employer-related) insurance 
purchased in the health insurance exchanges. The remainder 
would obtain coverage in an exchange through their employer.
Summary
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With the enactment of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 on March 30, 2010, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act became law, fundamentally 
changing health insurance and access to health care in the 
United States. This brief provides an overview of how the ACA 
would affect the types of health insurance coverage Americans 
have, the number of those without insurance, and America’s 
overall spending on acute care for the nonelderly. Multi-year cost 
control provisions and provisions affecting primarily the elderly, 
such as Medicare payment reductions, were not simulated. After 
examining how the distribution of insurance coverage would 
change under health reform, we look more closely at the newly 
insured under the ACA and those still left uninsured. We then 
present overall health care spending by households, employers, 
and the government both with and without health reform. 
We consider Medicaid/CHIP costs and enrollment, as well as 
aspects of the new health insurance exchanges, such as coverage, 
subsidies, and employee choice vouchers.
To estimate the effects of health reform, we use the Urban 
Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model.1 HIPSM 
simulates the decisions of businesses and individuals in response 
to policy changes, such as Medicaid expansions, new health 
insurance options, subsidies for the purchase of health insurance, 
and insurance market reforms. The model provides estimates of 
changes in government and private spending, premiums, rates 
of employer offers of coverage, and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specific reforms.2 
We simulate the main coverage provisions of the ACA as if they 
were fully implemented in 2010 and compare the results to HIPSM’s 
pre-reform baseline results for 2010. This approach differs from 
those of the CBO or the CMS actuaries, which by necessity provide 
10-year estimates. Our approach permits more direct comparisons of 
reform with the prereform baseline. The most important provisions 
of the ACA for the results we present are summarized below.3 
  » Medicaid eligibility is expanded to 133 percent of the federal 
poverty level4 (FPL) for all adults, with the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program remaining in place at current levels. 
Also, 5 percent of income is disregarded when determining 
eligibility, so the eligibility level is effectively 138 percent of 
the FPL.5 Medicaid maintenance-of-eligibility requirements 
for adults are dropped when the reforms are fully 
implemented, reducing the number of adults with incomes 
above 138 percent of the FPL who would have been eligible 
with maintenance of eligibility.6 
  » New state-based health insurance exchanges (exchanges) offer 
plans constructed to meet actuarial value standards of 60, 70, 
and 80 percent.7 Exchange plans are guaranteed issue, as are all 
plans in the small-group and nongroup markets. Premiums 
may be rated by age and tobacco use, with age bands of up 
to 3:1 and tobacco-use bands of up to 1.5:1.8 Exchange-based 
insurance coverage is available to individuals and families 
purchasing nongroup coverage independent of an employer 
and to employer groups with 100 or fewer employees.9 
Undocumented immigrants are barred from the exchanges.
  » Refundable premium tax credits (subsidies) are available to 
eligible families purchasing insurance through the exchange. 
These are provided on a sliding scale basis. They limit the 
maximum percentage of income that a family would have 
to spend on its health insurance premium. The limit is 2 
percent of income for those with incomes up to 133 percent 
of the FPL,10 3 to 4 percent of income for those with incomes 
between 133 and 150 percent of the FPL, 4 to 6.3 percent 
for those with incomes between 150 and 200 percent of the 
FPL, 6.3 to 9.5 percent for those with incomes between 200 
and 300 percent of the FPL, and 9.5 percent for those with 
incomes between 300 and 400 percent of the FPL.11 
  » Cost-sharing subsidies are available to those with incomes 
below 250 percent of the FPL and reduced maximum out-of-
pocket limits are provided to those with incomes below 400 
percent of the FPL.12 
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  » There is an individual mandate introducing a penalty for 
remaining uninsured. Undocumented immigrants, Native 
Americans, prisoners, and those below the tax filing 
threshold will be exempt from the mandate. Exemptions 
will also be granted for hardships in obtaining coverage, 
religious conscience and if no affordable insurance coverage 
is available.13 The penalty when fully phased in will be the 
greater of 2.5 percent of income or $695 for an individual 
or $2,085 for a family (in 2016 dollars), not to exceed an 
applicable national average premium.
  » Regardless of income, employees of firms that offer coverage 
would be ineligible for subsidized coverage in the exchange 
unless the employee’s share of the premium exceeds 9.5 percent 
of income or if the actuarial value of the employer’s plan is less 
than 60 percent. 
  » Employee choice vouchers are available to workers whose 
employers offer health insurance coverage through the 
workplace, whose incomes are below 400 percent of the FPL 
and whose share of the lowest offered employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI) premium is between 8 and 9.8 percent of 
income. Qualified workers would receive a voucher for the 
amount that their employer would have contributed to their 
insurance premium if they had enrolled in the employer’s 
plan. They can then apply this voucher to help pay for 
insurance through an exchange.14 
  » A small group tax credit is available to firms that offer health 
insurance, have 25 or fewer employees, and have workers with 
an average pay of less than $50,000.
  » New assessments may apply to employers with more than 
50 employees. If such a firm does not offer coverage and 
has at least one full-time employee who receives a subsidy 
in the exchange, a fee of $2,000 per full-time employee is 
assessed, excluding the first 30 employees. Employers that do 
offer coverage but have at least one full-time employee who 
receives a subsidy are assessed the lesser of $3,000 for each 
employee getting subsidies or $2,000 per full-time employee.
  » There is risk adjustment in the nongroup and small-group ESI 
markets between plans both inside and outside the exchange.
  » Most health insurance market reforms apply to all nongroup 
and small-group (up to 100 workers) ESI policies issued inside 
or outside the exchange, except for grandfathered plans.15 
Many provisions of the ACA, particularly those related to the 
exchanges, allow states considerable freedom in implementation. 
Some of the provisions that we model with a single national 
policy will likely vary by state. 
To model the individual mandate, we begin with the baseline 
HIPSM model, in which behavior is calibrated to reflect the 
results of the empirical health economics literature. The 
resulting model behavior is applicable for a voluntary health 
insurance regime; however, we must simulate how behavior 
would change in the presence of a mandate. Since a similar 
law only exists in Massachusetts after its health reforms, the 
only available empirical data are from that state.16 We thus 
use the Massachusetts Health Insurance Survey to inform 
the behavioral effects of individuals under a mandate. Our 
simulation of how behavior would change under the mandate 
has three components:17 
1. The applicable financial penalty. A computation of 
whether or not the penalty is applicable and the amount  
of the penalty as defined by the law, i.e., the fully phased  
in amount discounted to present dollars. 
2. An additional “disutility” of not complying with the 
mandate. The mandate is more than a dollar amount, it is a 
legal requirement. Desire to comply with the law, or at least 
to avoid enforcement and the stigma of noncompliance, has 
often led to behavioral responses much stronger than the 
amount of the nominal penalty would suggest. The mandate 
has the effect of making being uninsured less desirable—we 
operationalize this in the model by applying an additional 
“psychic” penalty to being uninsured.18 
3. A relatively small “spillover” disutility of being uninsured 
on populations not bound by the mandate. The mandate 
in Massachusetts was associated with an increase in coverage 
among those not actually bound by the mandate. We assume 
that this association was driven, in part, by a spillover effect 
of the mandate on those who were not bound by it who either 
mistakenly assumed they were or who reacted to a new social 
norm to have coverage. In addition to uncertainty about the 
current applicability of the mandate, people may also be 
making a judgment about whether they will lose their mandate 
exemption in the future due to rising income. For those exempt 
from the mandate, the amount of additional disutility of being 
uninsured is far smaller than for those bound by the mandate.
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Table 1: Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Nonelderly in Baseline and Reform
Figure1: Number of Uninsured by Income Group
Changes in Health Insurance Coverage
We first consider how health insurance coverage changes under 
the ACA. Table 1 compares the distribution of coverage with 
and without health reform. Without reform, there would be 
49.9 million nonelderly persons without health insurance (18.6 
percent of the nonelderly population), as opposed to 22.1 million 
uninsured with reform (8.3 percent).19 Thus, the ACA achieves a 
major goal of health reform, decreasing the uninsured by more 
than half. Below, we consider in more detail those insured under 
the ACA who would not have had insurance without reform and 
those still without insurance coverage under the ACA.
The number of persons covered by insurance through an employer 
under the ACA would remain largely unchanged (by 0.5 million 
people or 0.2 percent of the nonelderly population). More than 
half of nonelderly Americans (151.1 million or 56.4 percent) 
would still obtain coverage through an employer; 20.7 million of 
these would be covered by employer-sponsored plans in the new 
health insurance exchanges. 
The new nongroup health insurance exchanges would insure 
23.1 million nonelderly Americans (8.7 percent). Nongroup 
insurance outside the exchange would cover only 3.3 million (1.2 
percent). Taking these two together, the nongroup market would 
grow dramatically in size from 14.8 million nonelderly persons 
covered without reform to 26.5 million after reform. 
The Medicaid expansion under the ACA leads to significantly higher 
Medicaid/CHIP enrollment (59.7 million or 22.3 percent of the 
nonelderly) than without reform (42.9 million or 16 percent). Other 
types of public insurance coverage do not change significantly.
Without Reform With Reforma Change
Coverage (in millions)
Insured 218.0 81.3% 245.9 91.8% 27.8 10.5%
Employer (non-exchange) 151.6 56.6% 130.4 48.7% -21.2 -7.9%
Employer (exchanges) 0.0 0.0% 20.7 7.7% 20.7 7.7%
Nongroup (non-exchange) 14.8 5.5% 3.3 1.2% -11.6 -4.3%
Nongroup (exchanges) 0.0 0.0% 23.1 8.7% 23.1 8.7%
Medicaid/CHIP 42.9 16.0% 59.7 22.3% 16.7 6.3%
Other (including Medicare) 8.7 3.2% 8.7 3.2% 0.0 0.0%
Uninsured 49.9 18.6% 22.1 8.3% -27.8 -10.3%
Total 268.0 100.0% 268.0 100.0% 0.0 0.0%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010. 
a. We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
< 200% FPL
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Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010. 
* We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
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Changes in Those without Health Insurance
As we have seen, health reform would reduce the number 
of nonelderly Americans without health insurance by more 
than half to 22.1 million. Figure 1 shows the distribution 
of the uninsured before and after reform by income group. 
The majority of the prereform uninsured (33.1 million) have 
household incomes below 200 percent of the FPL. The number 
of uninsured in this income category falls to 13.7 million under 
the ACA, a decrease of nearly 60 percent. In the next income 
group, from 200 to 299 percent of the FPL, the number of 
uninsured drops 56 percent from 8.1 million to 3.6 million under 
the ACA. Higher income categories also see significant declines 
in the uninsured, but there are far fewer uninsured in these 
groups to begin with. Note that there are more uninsured in the 
400+ percent of the FPL group than in the 300 to 400 percent 
of the FPL group because there are about three times as many 
people in that income group; the uninsured rate is much lower in 
the higher income group.
Those Newly Insured under the ACA
In Figure 2, we take a closer look at the 49.9 million nonelderly 
Americans who would be uninsured without reform and see 
what type of insurance coverage they would obtain under the 
ACA, if any. The majority (59 percent) would be covered by 
public or private insurance, but 41 percent of them would remain 
uninsured. Medicaid and CHIP would cover 29 percent. The new 
heath insurance exchanges, either nongroup or ESI, would cover 
19 percent, 17 percent in nongroup exchanges and 2 percent in ESI 
exchanges. ESI outside the exchange would cover 9 percent, and 
nongroup insurance outside the exchange would cover 2 percent.
The Remaining Uninsured
In Figure 3, we examine the 22.1 million nonelderly Americans 
who would be left without insurance under the ACA. More than 
a quarter of these would be undocumented immigrants, who are 
barred from both public coverage and the new health insurance 
exchanges. Nearly two-fifths of the remaining uninsured are 
eligible for Medicaid or CHIP, but have not enrolled. This 
group could be reached by more effective outreach or automatic 
enrollment. Eight percent are legal residents, ineligible for 
Medicaid and CHIP, and qualify for an affordability exemption 
from the individual mandate penalties. Finally, 28 percent (just 
over 6 million people) are subject to the mandate but choose to 
opt out of insurance coverage and risk the relevant penalties.20 
Changes in Health Care Spending
Table 2 shows how spending on acute care for the nonelderly 
by different payers varies with and without reform. As noted 
earlier, we do not simulate multiyear cost control provisions 
or provisions such as Medicare payment reductions affecting 
primarily the elderly. Overall spending by individuals, 
employers, the government, and uncompensated care would be 
higher under the ACA than without reform by $53.1 billion or 
4.5 percent. As noted above, this does not account for various 
Medicare, Medicaid, and cost-containment provisions that would 
reduce net new spending. For comparison, Table 1 shows that the 
number of nonelderly Americans with health insurance coverage 
is 12.7 percent higher under the ACA than without reform.
Government spending on acute care for the nonelderly 
(excluding all spending on the elderly and Medicaid long-term 
care spending on the non-elderly) would increase under the ACA 
41%
Uninsured
Public
coverage
Nongroup 
exchange
ESI outside 
exchange
ESI exchange
Nongroup outside 
exchange
29%
17%
9%
2%
2% 38%
26%
8%
28%Medicaid/CHIP 
eligibles
Subject to 
mandate
Undocumented 
immigrants
With affordability 
exemption
Figure 2:  Those Uninsured without Reform—What 
Coverage Would They Have with Reform?
Figure 3:  Those Left Uninsured under Reform
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by $69.1 billion—from $244.2 billion to $313.3 billion. This is 
due mainly to the Medicaid expansion and increased enrollment 
by those already eligible for public coverage ($53.6 billion) 
and premium and cost-sharing subsidies for households in the 
exchange ($33 billion in premium and cost-sharing subsidies). 
The government also would pay $4.5 billion in small employer 
tax subsidies and would collect $21.9 billion in employer and 
individual penalties. The latter are not actually health care 
spending, but are the result of the ACA, so we include them.
Employer spending would be 0.6 percent lower under reform 
($510.2 billion) than without reform ($515.3 billion). A decrease 
of $19.2 billion in employer premium contributions is offset 
by $17.6 billion in assessments paid by firms with 50 or more 
employees. Firms with fewer than 25 employees would receive 
$4.5 billion in subsidies (tax credits). Employers would pay $3 
billion in employee choice vouchers their workers would use for 
purchasing exchange-based coverage. 
Individuals would spend $29.5 billion (or 8.7 percent) more for 
health care under the ACA than without reform ($370 billion 
versus $340.5 billion). The $29.5 billion is less than one half of 
one percent of personal income of the nonelderly population. 
This increase is due almost entirely to spending on new health 
coverage and individual mandate penalties for those uninsured 
before reform ($28 billion, not shown in the table). The 102.3 
million nonelderly persons with incomes below 200 percent of 
the FPL would spend $10.7 billion less under the ACA due to 
the Medicaid expansion and the substantial subsidies available 
to this group. The 71.6 million nonelderly with incomes between 
200 and 400 percent of the FPL would see a total rise in spending 
of $12.6 billion, reflecting a large increase in coverage and use of 
health care services. This group is eligible for some subsidies, but 
their generosity is phased down substantially as income increases. 
Finally, the 94.2 million nonelderly with incomes above 400 
percent of the FPL would spend $27.6 billion more. Most of 
these—in particular, those with ESI coverage—would see little 
increase in spending. The increase in both of the latter groups 
is due primarily to new premium spending by the previously 
uninsured.
Uncompensated care provided to those without insurance is a 
significant cost ($69.7 billion without reform) currently paid by 
the federal government, state and local governments, health care 
providers, and others. The ACA would cut uncompensated care 
costs by 61 percent, to $27.3 billion. These reductions would 
allow the government to cut outlays for programs that now 
support the uninsured. They could also result in lower private 
premiums and higher provider revenue.
Table 2: Health Care Spending of Government, Employers, 
Individuals, and Uncompensated Care in Baseline and Reform
Baseline
(in millions)
After 
Reform
(in  
millions)
Change
(in millions)
Percent 
Change
Government Spending
Medicaid/SCHIPa $244,180 $297,740 $53,560 21.9%
Premium subsidies $0 $26,860 $26,860 n.a.
Cost-sharing subsidies $0 $6,090 $6,090 n.a.
Employer subsidies $0 $4,479 $4,479 n.a.
Individual mandates $0 -$4,290 -$4,290 n.a.
Employer assessments $0 -$17,601 -$17,601 n.a.
Net Government Spending $244,180 $313,277 $69,097 28.3%
Employer Spending
ESI premiums $513,293 $494,068 -$19,225 -3.7%
Employer assessments $0 $17,601 $17,601 n.a.
Voucher amount $0 $2,995 $2,995 n.a.
Employer subsidies $0 -$4,479 -$4,479 n.a.
Net Employer Spending $513,293 $510,185 -$3,108 -0.6%
Individual Spending
Net out-of-pocket premiums $180,786 $211,538 $30,752 17.0%
Net out-of-pocket cost-sharing $159,694 $154,138 -$5,556 -3.5%
Individual mandates $0 $4,290 $4,290 n.a.
Total Individual Spending $340,479 $369,966 $29,487 8.7%
<200% FPL $70,513 $59,824 -$10,689 -15.2%
200-399% FPL $100,316 $112,871 $12,555 12.5%
>400% FPL $169,650 $197,271 $27,621 16.3%
Uncompensated Care
Total uncompensated spending $69,633 $27,250 -$42,383 -60.9%
Overall Spending $1,167,586 $1,220,679 $53,093 4.5%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010. 
Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
a. Spending on acute care costs for the nonelderly. 
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In total, $1,167.6 billion would be spent without health reform 
and $1,220.7 billion would be spent under the ACA, an increase 
of 4.5 percent. As noted above, these estimates are for a single year 
based on health care costs for 2010. Provisions in the ACA such as 
multiyear cost-control provisions and savings from Medicare and 
Medicaid were not simulated.21 This increase in costs would fund 
an increase in insurance coverage of 12.8 percent.
The Medicaid Expansion
We now consider the ACA Medicaid expansion in greater detail. 
Without health reform, 42.9 million nonelderly people would be 
enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP during 2010. Under the ACA, the 
expansion of Medicaid to 133 percent of the FPL plus a 5 percent 
income disregard increases overall enrollment in Medicaid and 
CHIP to 60.2 million.22 Of the 16.8 million nonelderly persons 
who would newly enroll in Medicaid or CHIP under the ACA, 
84 percent would have been uninsured without reform (Figure 4). 
The remainder would have been covered by either ESI (8 percent) 
or nongroup (8 percent) policies.
In Table 3, we see that the expansion enrolls many more adults 
(13.1 million) than children (3.7 million). Children in this 
income range tend to already be eligible for CHIP. Also, the 
newly enrolled nonparent adults have dramatically lower 
expenses on average than current nonparent adult enrollees, 
$3,601 versus $13,833. Considered in aggregate, enrollment for 
adult nonparents increases 111 percent while the amount spent 
on them increases by only 28.7 percent. Under pre-ACA rules, 
adult nonparent enrollees have particularly high average costs. 
Many, for example, are in Medicaid because they are medically 
needy or enrolled in SSI. The drop in average costs under the 
ACA for this group is largely a result of eligibility being based 
on an income threshold rather than special eligibility categories 
whose members often have a disproportionately greater need for 
health care services.
8%ESI
8%Nongroup
Uninsured
84%
ESI
18%
Uninsured
37%
Nongroup
45%
Figure 4:  Those Who Newly Enroll in Medicaid Under  
the ACA—What Coverage Would They Have  
Had without Reform?
Figure 5:  Those Covered by the Nongroup  
Exchange—What Coverage Would  
They Have Had without Reform?
Table 3: Medicaid/CHIP Enrollment and Costs, with and without Reform
Without Reform With Reforma Change Percent Change
Enrollees 
(millions)
Cost 
(billions $)
Average 
cost ($)
Enrollees 
(millions)
Cost  
(billions $)
Average 
cost ($)
Cost per 
new  
enrollee ($)
Enrollees Cost Enrollees Cost
Children 27.6 70.0 2,536 31.3 75.7 2,419 2,046 3.7 5.7 13.4% 8.1%
Adult parents 6.3 51.6 8,190 9.4 61.8 6,574 3,459 3.1 10.2 49.2% 19.8%
Adult Nonparents 9.0 124.5 13,833 19.0 160.2 8,432 3,601 10.0 35.7 111.1% 28.7%
Total 42.9 246.1 5,737 59.7 297.7 4,987 3,175 16.8 51.6 39.2% 21.0%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010. 
a. We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
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The Nongroup Exchanges
Under the ACA, 23.1 million nonelderly persons would be 
covered under the new nongroup health insurance exchanges; 
45 percent of these would have had nongroup coverage without 
reform (Figure 5). The exchange will, to a large extent, replace 
the existing nongroup market. There will, as we have seen, be a 
significant expansion of nongroup insurance coverage as well. 
Thirty-seven percent of those in a nongroup exchange would 
have been uninsured without health reform, and 18 percent 
would have had employer-sponsored coverage.
In Tables 4 and 5, we give an overview of coverage, subsidies, and 
vouchers in the nongroup exchange. More than two-thirds of the 
23.1 million nonelderly Americans covered under the nongroup 
exchange are in the premium subsidy eligibility range (below 400 
percent of the FPL) (Table 4). Nearly half of the single policies 
are held by those with incomes below 200 percent of the FPL 
and only 22.7 percent are above 400 percent of the FPL. The 
distribution of family policies is very different, with 39.3 percent 
of policies held by those above 400 percent of the FPL. Most 
of the families in this income group enrolled in the exchange 
do not have an ESI offer, but the age-rating and choice of plans 
with a lower actuarial value than comprehensive ESI make the 
exchange attractive to some with offers as well, particularly 
younger workers.
Those below 200 percent of the FPL account for 55.3 percent of 
those receiving subsidies, 64.4 percent of premium subsidies, and 
92.4 percent of cost-sharing subsidies (Table 5). The benefits of 
the voucher program are much more evenly distributed among 
those below 400 percent of the FPL.
Comparison with CBO Estimates
In Table 6, we compare our estimates of the distribution of 
health insurance coverage under health reform with those of the 
Congressional Budget Office.23 The focus of the CBO estimates 
is on multiyear spending and revenue projections, whereas in this 
research, we use a single-year simulation to present more detail in 
other areas. For example, under CBO estimates, provisions such 
as the exchanges phase in over several years. Thus, our estimates 
should be compared with their estimates of the earliest year in 
which the most important provisions are fully phased in, which 
is 2017. For comparison, we simulated the ACA in 2017 using 
the methodology developed in a series of papers last year.24 We 
age our data using demographic and economic projections from 
2010 to 2017.25 The behavior of households and firms is then 
simulated based on 2017. Thus, the results differ from the 2010 
Table 4:  Enrollment in the Nongroup Exchange  
by Income Group
Table 5:  Subsidies and Vouchers in the Nongroup Exchange by Income Group
With Reform
Single 
policies 
(millions)
Percent  
of total
Family 
policies 
(millions)
Percent  
of total
Persons 
covered 
(millions)
Percent  
of total
<200% FPL 6.1 46.8% 1.1 27.0% 8.2 35.4%
200-300% FPL 2.6 20.2% 0.9 21.5% 4.8 20.6%
300-400% FPL 1.3 10.3% 0.5 12.2% 2.7 11.7%
400%+ FPL 2.9 22.7% 1.6 39.3% 7.4 32.3%
Total 12.9 100.0% 4.2 100.0% 23.1 100.0%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010. 
Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
With Reform
Persons 
receiving 
subsidies 
(millions)
Percent  
of total
Total premium 
subsidies 
(billions $)
Percent  
of total
Total cost-
sharing 
 subsidies 
(billions $)
Percent  
of total
Persons 
receiving 
vouchers 
(millions)
Total voucher 
amount  
(billions $)
<200% FPL 5.8  55.3% 17.3 64.4% 4.1 92.4% 0.1 0.8
200-300% FPL 3.6 34.0% 7.4 27.7% 0.3 7.6% 0.1 1.3
300-400% FPL 1.1 10.6% 2.1 7.7% 0.0 0.0% 0.1 0.8
400%+ FPL 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.1
Total 10.5 100.0% 26.8 100.0% 4.4 100.0% 0.4 3.0
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010. 
Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act as if fully implemented in 2010.
America Under the Affordable Care Act
8
results presented elsewhere. These 2017 results are presented only 
for comparison with CBO’s 2017 results. 
The two estimates of coverage are very similar despite differences in 
the simulation models used. The largest coverage differences are 
for Medicaid/CHIP and nongroup and other public. These are 
in part due to higher Medicaid/CHIP take-up rates and in part to 
differences in aging from 2010 to 2017 (explained below). To show 
that our costs are not incompatible with the CBO’s, we compare 
estimates of the two largest components of government costs, the 
Medicaid/CHIP expansion and subsidies in the exchanges. The 
CBO has higher subsidy costs and lower Medicaid costs than 
our estimates, but the total of these two is very similar.26 The 
following are likely explanations of these differences, with further 
explanations of our methodology where needed:
  » The most important difference is in Medicaid take-up rates. 
We assume somewhat higher rates than the CBO appears 
to assume. We calibrate the behavior of our model so that 
a standard expansion of Medicaid and CHIP achieves 
take-up rates consistent with the empirical literature.27 We 
start with target take-up rates for the uninsured between 
60 and 70 percent, depending on person type and income 
group. But, the ACA contains important provisions that 
would increase take-up. States are required to establish a 
web site capable of determining eligibility for Medicaid and 
automatically enrolling eligibles. Hospitals would be able to 
make presumptive eligibility determinations. There would 
be other new requirements for simplifying enrollment and 
renewal of Medicaid and CHIP. After taking these and other 
factors into account, HIPSM generates a take-up rate of about 
73 percent for the uninsured who are newly eligible. This rate 
is higher than the initial rate due to outreach and enrollment 
simplification provisions in the ACA, as well as a modest 
indirect effect of the individual mandate as observed in 
health reform in Massachusetts.
  » Our economic projections from 2010 to 2017 are not identical 
to those used by CBO. Also, we project that current trends 
in the distribution of income will continue. CBO’s income 
distribution projections may differ from ours.26 These 
differences could explain much of the difference in ESI, 
Medicaid/CHIP, and nongroup coverage.
  » The nongroup and other public category in the CBO report 
combines multiple forms of coverage, making it more difficult 
to explain differences. An important reason for the difference 
is very likely to be in projections of nongroup coverage 
outside the exchange. As explained above, we simulate 
risk adjustment between the nongroup markets inside and 
outside the exchange and standards for premium rating and 
benefit packages that apply to both. We do not simulate 
grandfathered plans. Reflected in our estimates is the view 
that it will be difficult for non-grandfathered plans outside 
the exchange to differentiate themselves from exchange 
plans unless a state aggressively restricts the number of plans 
allowed into the exchange. As grandfathered plans decline, 
the non-exchange, nongroup market is likely to be small and 
may disappear entirely in some states. 
Table 6:  Comparison of Estimated Coverage and Selected 
Costs for 2017 under the ACA
CBO HIPSM
Coverage (in millions)
Employer (exchange and non-exchange) 57% 55%
Nongroup and other public 9% 4%
Exchange nongroup 8% 8%
Medicaid/CHIP 19% 24%
Uninsured 8% 9%
Selected Government Costs (in billions $)
Medicaid/CHIP costs due to the expansion 87 101
Premium and cost-sharing subsidies 75 51
Total 162 152
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010 and CBO analysis, March 20, 2010.
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A Large Expansion of Insurance Coverage. Health reform 
would cut the number of nonelderly persons without health 
insurance by more than half, from 49.9 million to 22.3 million. 
Of the 27.6 million who would gain insurance coverage under 
health reform, slightly more than half would gain public 
coverage through the Medicaid expansion; the rest would 
purchase private insurance. Our analysis of those left uninsured 
under the ACA suggests some policy changes that could 
significantly increase insurance coverage. Nearly two-fifths of 
the 22.3 million left uninsured would be eligible for Medicaid 
or CHIP. These could be reached by increased outreach or an 
expansion of automatic enrollment programs. Tax returns, for 
example, could be examined to identify and enroll eligibles. 
Similarly, tax filers could be automatically notified of health 
insurance subsidies in the exchange for which they would be 
eligible. Just over a quarter of the uninsured are undocumented 
immigrants. These are barred by law from all of the benefits of 
health reform and are even prevented from purchasing coverage 
in the exchange with their own money. 
Little Change in Employer Coverage. The number of people 
covered by employer-sponsored insurance plans would remain 
largely unchanged under the ACA; 56 percent of nonelderly 
persons would still be covered by ESI plans. Many of these would 
be covered by plans in the new exchanges offered as benefits by 
small employers. Some small employers would drop, but others 
would begin offering coverage resulting from increased worker 
demand due to the mandate and other factors. A forthcoming 
policy brief will examine ESI under health reform in greater detail.
Expansion of the Nongroup Market in Exchanges. Nearly 
10 percent of the nonelderly would be covered by nongroup 
insurance policies. The vast majority of these would be covered 
by the exchanges. Undocumented immigrants cannot purchase 
coverage in the exchange, so those purchasing coverage would do 
so outside the exchange. However, the individual mandate and 
associated penalties do not apply to them. With risk adjustment 
and minimum benefit requirements, how nongroup policies 
outside the exchange would differentiate themselves from those 
inside and remain competitive is not clear. A nongroup market 
outside the exchange would almost certainly need more than 
demand from undocumented immigrants to remain viable; such 
coverage may vanish entirely outside the exchange in some states.
More than two-thirds of those enrolled in the nongroup 
exchanges would be in the subsidy eligibility range, below 400 
percent of the FPL. More than half of those in the nongroup 
exchanges would be covered under single policies, and nearly 
half of those would be held by persons below 200 percent of 
the FPL. Those below 200 percent of the FPL, single or family, 
account for nearly two-thirds of premium subsidy costs and 
more than 90 percent of cost-sharing subsidy costs. The benefits 
of employee choice vouchers are distributed much more evenly 
among those below 400 percent of the FPL.
Increased Medicaid Coverage. The Medicaid expansion in 
the ACA would increase the enrollment of nonelderly Americans 
in Medicaid and CHIP by 16.8 million, with total enrollment 
reaching 59.7 million people. Most of the new enrollees will be 
adults, particularly adults who are not parents. Children below 
138 percent of the FPL are already eligible for CHIP in many 
states, so they are much less likely to gain eligibility for public 
coverage. Since Medicaid eligibility under the ACA is based on 
an income threshold rather than on eligibility pathways that may 
depend on combinations of income, health status, and spending, 
the new adults enrolled will be dramatically cheaper to cover, 
on average, than current Medicaid-enrolled adults. For example, 
the average cost of a newly enrolled nonelderly adult nonparent 
would be about $3,600, while the average cost of a nonelderly 
adult nonparent enrolled under prereform Medicaid would be 
more than $13,800.
Increased Overall Spending. Total system spending on acute 
care for the nonelderly would be 4.5 percent higher under health 
reform than without health reform. It should be noted that our 
results are based on health expenditures for 2010; the effects 
of various Medicare and Medicaid savings and cost-control 
provisions over time are not simulated. Those who would gain 
insurance coverage under the ACA are in general less expensive 
than those who are currently insured. An important reason for 
this is that in the current voluntary health insurance markets, 
those with high health costs have a higher demand for insurance 
and those with low costs are more likely to take the risk of going 
without it. The ACA covers more of the latter, both with carrots, 
such as exchange subsidies, and sticks, such as the individual 
mandate. Also, there will likely be administrative cost savings 
associated with the new health insurance exchanges. 
Discussion
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Little Change in Total Employer Spending. The total health 
care costs to employers would be nearly the same under the 
ACA as without reform. A savings of $19.2 billion in premium 
contributions would be offset by $17.6 billion in assessments on 
employers with more than 50 employees. The smallest employers 
would receive $4.5 billion in tax credits, and employers would 
pay $3 billion in employee choice vouchers. Employers may 
deduct the full amount of any vouchers they issue from their 
taxes. We do not simulate corporate income taxes, so the savings 
from this deduction are not included.
Increased Total Individual Spending for Those Uninsured 
Without Reform. Individual spending on health care would 
increase by 8.7 percent under the ACA, due mostly to spending 
on new health insurance by those uninsured before reform. As 
noted, the increase in individual spending is less than one half of 
one percent of personal income. Nonelderly Americans under 200 
percent of the FPL would spend significantly less in total on health 
care under reform due to the Medicaid expansion and generous 
subsidies available in the exchange. Those with incomes between 
200 and 400 percent of the FPL would in total spend somewhat 
more. Exchange subsidies are available for this group, but their 
generosity is far less than for those below 200 percent of the FPL. 
The total health care spending of those above 400 percent of the 
FPL—and thus ineligible for subsidies—would also increase. Most 
middle- and higher-income Americans—in particular, those with 
ESI coverage—would see little increase in spending. The increase 
is due primarily to new premium spending by the previously 
uninsured.
The results from Table 2 are aggregate costs, determined both 
by the number of people covered and their average cost. It 
must be emphasized that individual health care costs alone are 
not enough to judge whether an individual or family is better 
off. Health insurance hedges against the risk of high health 
care expenses. Spending more money to purchase a more 
comprehensive insurance policy may well be a better choice 
for an individual or family. This is particularly true of those 
currently uninsured. They do not pay premiums, but they incur 
risk. Further, much of the health care cost of the uninsured ends 
up as uncompensated care.
Substantially Reduced Uncompensated Care. The cost of 
uncompensated care provided to the uninsured declines by 60 
percent, resulting in savings of $42.3 billion. It is a substantial 
offset to the increase in other costs under the ACA, equal to 
61 percent of the net amount spent by the government. Not all 
of the savings would be realized by the government as some 
uncompensated care is paid for by others such as health care 
providers. However, it has been estimated that about three-
quarters of uncompensated care is financed by federal, state, and 
local governments, through DSH payments and other provisions.29 
In this paper, we have provided an overview of the effects of the 
ACA compared to what the situation would be without health 
reform. Our single-year estimates complement the 10-year cost 
estimates previously released by CBO and the CMS Office of the 
Actuary, providing many results—particularly for coverage and 
transitions in coverage—that are either new or presented in greater 
detail. Forthcoming research will build on what is presented here 
and will focus on specific issues in health reform.
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1 For more about HIPSM and a list of recent research using it, see http://www.urban.
org/uploadedpdf/412154-Health-Microsimulation-Capabilities.pdf. A more technical 
description of the construction of the model can be found in Bowen Garrett, John 
Holahan, Irene Headen, and Aaron Lucas, “The Coverage and Cost Impacts of Expanding 
Medicaid” (Washington, DC: The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 
2009), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411905.
2 HIPSM uses data from several national data sets: the March Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement, the February CPS Contingent Work 
and Alternative Employment Supplement, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS), the Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Tax File, and the Statistics of U.S. 
Business. Distributions of coverage are based on March CPS data with adjustments for 
the Medicaid undercount. 
3 For more details, see, for example, the Kaiser Family Foundation’s Summary of New 
Health Reform Law, http://www.kff.org/healthreform/8061.cfm. 
4 In the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, the 2009 federal poverty level 
is $14,570 for a family of two and $22,050 for a family of four. The 2009 levels were still 
in effect for 2010 at the time of writing. For more information, see http://aspe.hhs.gov/
poverty/09poverty.shtml.
5 The requirement that eligibility for Medicaid be based on modified AGI would eliminate 
certain income disregards currently used in determining eligibility. The 5 percent disregard 
was intended as a substitute.
6 For this simulation, we drop maintenance of effort for adults above 138 percent of the FPL 
who gain Medicaid eligibility through Section 1115 waivers or special state programs. States 
may be more or less aggressive in rescinding maintenance of eligibility than simulated here. 
We preserve Medicaid and CHIP maintenance-of-eligibility requirements for children, 
since these are mandated until 2019.
7 Actuarial value reflects the share of average covered benefits paid by the insurer, where the 
remaining amount is the responsibility of the enrollee. The ACA allows exchange plans to 
offer a 90 percent actuarial value plan as well. We do not model this in the exchange. Such 
a package would be significantly more comprehensive than a typical ESI plan now; even the 
80 percent plan would be more comprehensive than many current ESI plans for small and 
medium-sized firms. In Massachusetts under health reform, the most generous policy in the 
Connector (a program similar to the ACA’s nongroup exchanges) has low enrollment. We 
do not model the catastrophic-only plan available to some young adults and to those exempt 
from the individual mandate. The experience of Massachusetts under health reform suggests 
that this provision would have not have a large impact. We also do not model the option for a 
state basic health plan. A forthcoming policy brief will focus on this option.
8 This means, for example, that the premium charged to the oldest policyholders may be at 
most three times the premium charged to the youngest policyholders and tobacco users can 
be charged 1.5 times as much as nonusers.
9 We model a merged exchange providing coverage to both individual and small-group 
purchasers. States can choose to have separate exchanges for these two markets. We have 
simulated the latter option and the results do not differ substantially from those presented 
here. The SHOP exchanges are implemented as follows. Employers offer the same policies 
as in the nongroup exchanges. Total premiums for an employer’s SHOP plan are based on 
the age and tobacco use distribution of their workers, i.e., employers contribute the same to 
all workers regardless of age or tobacco use. There are currently some small firms who self-
insure. We simulate this and allow them to continue if they choose to do so. Some believe 
that more small firms may start self-insuring to avoid certain insurance market reforms; we 
do not simulate such behavior.
10 Those eligible for Medicaid would not be eligible for subsidies. Note that legal immigrants 
with incomes below 138 percent of the FPL who have been in the United States less than 
five years are not eligible for Medicaid but would be eligible for subsidies in the exchange.
11 It is not entirely clear how the computation of premium subsidies would be affected by 
tobacco rating; this will be determined through regulations. The use of age-rated premiums 
is explicit in the legislation, that is, the maximum amount a subsidy-eligible person would 
have to pay in premiums would not vary by age, but that is not true of tobacco rating. The 
most likely interpretation, which we simulate, is that the additional cost of a tobacco-use 
policy is borne by the subsidy-eligible policyholder rather than the government.
12 The cost-sharing subsidies are 94 percent actuarial value (AV) for 100 to 150 percent of the 
FPL, 85 percent AV for 150 to 200 percent of the FPL, and 73 percent AV for 200 to 250 
percent of the FPL. 
13 Specifically, under the ACA, an uninsured individual is exempt from penalty if the 
individual premium he or she faces is more than 8 percent of family income. According 
to the Joint Committee on Taxation’s Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the 
“Reconciliation Act of 2010, as amended, in combination with the Patient Protection and Affordable 
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Care Act” ( JCX-18-10, March 21, 2010), if self-only coverage is affordable for the worker 
but family coverage is not, the employee will be subject to the penalty for nonenrollment, 
while the family members eligible for employer coverage through that employee would not 
be penalized. It is unclear at the present time whether those family members would then 
be eligible for subsidies for coverage purchased through the exchange. JCT’s explanation 
of this provision highlighted the lack of clarity in the language of the statute. Their 
interpretation is not binding; the precise rules will be specified in regulations issued by the 
executive branch. It is, however, the most authoritative interpretation currently available, 
so we use it in our modeling. The ACA also allows other financial hardship exemptions 
to be granted. The requirements for these are left to the discretion of the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services.
14 For more about vouchers, see Matthew Buettgens and Linda Blumberg, “Making Health 
Reform More Affordable for Working Families: The Effect of Employee Choice Vouchers” 
(Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2010), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412025. 
15 Certain market reforms do apply to large employers and grandfathered plans, for example, 
the prohibition against rescissions, and lifetime and annual benefit limits. For more detail, 
see Linda J. Blumberg, “How Will the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Affect 
Small, Medium, and Large Businesses?”(Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2010), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412180-ppaca-businesses.pdf.  
 We do not simulate grandfathered plans. These will largely disappear over time, and our 
intent is to simulate the ACA in a steady-state marketplace.
16 Sharon K. Long, Allison Cook, and Karen Stockley, “Access to Health Care in 
Massachusetts: Estimates from the 2008 Massachusetts Health Insurance Survey” 
(Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2010), http://www.urban.org/url.
cfm?ID=1001403. See also earlier work using the Massachusetts Health Insurance Survey 
by Sharon Long and other co-authors.
17 For more details, see Matthew Buettgens, Bowen Garrett, and John Holahan, “Why the 
Individual Mandate Matters” (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, forthcoming).
18 Behavior in HIPSM is modeled in an expected utility framework. This “penalty” is thus the 
utility of complying with the law.
19 The number of uninsured without health insurance is based on results from the 2009 
Current Population Survey aged to 2010. This was the latest CPS available at the time 
of writing. The aging takes into account demographic changes projected by the Census 
Bureau as well as economic changes, such as changes in the unemployment rate. The latest 
2010 CPS released mid-September showed an estimated 50.7 million uninsured. Our 2010 
estimate is somewhat lower due primarily to the Medicaid undercount adjustment, which 
results in fewer uninsured than the unadjusted CPS.
20 There is a provision for hardship exemptions from the mandate.  These are left up to the 
discretion of the HHS secretary.  No guidelines have been issued yet, so these exemptions 
could not be modeled.
21 The CBO projects the 10-year cost of the ACA to be roughly $1 trillion with savings 
offsetting about half of the cost.
22 This increase of 16.8 million is larger than that projected by the CBO, which projects 16 
million in 2019. The state-level estimates in John Holahan and Irene Headen, “Medicaid 
Coverage and Spending in Health Reform: National and State-by-State Results for Adults 
at or below 133% Poverty” (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2009) are based on 
lower Medicaid take-up rates for the uninsured similar to CBO, as well as a set of higher 
take-up assumptions.
23 Congressional Budget Office, “Estimate of the direct spending and revenue effects of an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4872, the Reconciliation Act of 2010,” 
March 20, 2010.
24 Bowen Garrett, Matthew Buettgens, Lan Doan, Irene Headen, and John Holahan, “The 
Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform: 2010-2020,” (Washington, DC: The Urban 
Institute, 2010) http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412049.
25 Specifically, we use the projections of the “Best Case” scenario in Garrett, Buettgens, Doan, 
Headen, and Holahan 2010.
26 We emphasize that these cost estimates are for 2017 only. The $1 trillion in government 
costs projected by the CBO and frequently quoted in the media is a 10-year total.
27 See, for example, Bowen Garrett, John Holahan, Allison Cook, Irene Headen, and Aaron 
Lucas, “The Coverage and Cost Impacts of Expanding Medicaid” (Washington, DC: The 
Urban Institute, 2009), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7901.pdf. 
28 For details, see Garrett, Buettgens, Doan, Headen, and Holahan 2010.
29 Jack Hadley, John Holahan, Teresa Coughlin, and Dawn Miller, “Covering the Uninsured 
in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs,” Health Affairs Web 
Exclusive, August 25, 2008.
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